INTRODUCTION

A small number of investigations have interrogated the role of historical discourse, historical imaginaries, selective remembering and heritage in new forms of local place marketing and urban branding in China (Wu, W., 1999; 2004; Pan, nd; 2005; Ren, 2008; Jansson and Lagerkvist, 2009; Law, 2012). The majority of this work has often focused on the large coastal city of Shanghai, leaving ordinary, quotidian and/or everyday cities outside of the mainstream of contemporary analysis. Specifically, second tier cities, have been less well examined in the process of understanding how elites construct selective forms of remembering and historical place marketing at the local urban level (Mullich, 2011). In the work that follows, we focus our sights upon the second tier city of Wuhan because it is both an interesting everyday city, and a competitive urban actor that has vigorously sought to improve its domestic and international political status. As we shall argue, selective remembering, nostalgia and heritage are now increasingly used by assemblages of state and non-state actors in Wuhan to improve the city’s competitiveness and fortunes. In sum, this paper has two main lines of investigation: firstly, we shall explore the process by which selective remembering, histories and heritage are converted into new form of competitive urban cultural capital; secondly, this paper points to the critical dangers and problematics that emerge when selective remembering and historic urban branding lead to the production of new urban landscapes and commercial spaces; as we shall demonstrate, selective remembering and branding can sabotage and displace communities, informal economies, histories, lives and subjectivities.

Wuhan: Constructing a Competitive World City

Compared to other Chinese cities with well understood historical connections, (such as Xi’an or Nanjing), the mid central Chinese city of Wuhan might seem a peculiar unit of analysis; though, as we shall claim it is exactly these less prestigious historic connections, that make the city so
interesting to study, particularly in terms of the way the local government has prominently sought to excavate the history of the city. Indeed, within China’s domestic context, Wuhan has been regarded as a second tier city, within a popular unofficial 4 city tier classification system (A1). Second tier cities are understood to be the “growth engines of the Chinese economy, boosted by huge amounts of investment, new infrastructure and an influx of new talent” (Mullich, 2011). In this regard, our choice of Wuhan as a unit of analysis is based on the premise that the city is an emerging economic and political actor. Thus, despite the slow or no growth of its economy during certain periods (especially during the 1960s and 70s), in 1981 “Wuhan was China’s fourth largest industrial center, next to Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin” (Han and Wu, 2004, 351). However, during the period between 1985-1997, Wuhan’s position in China’s urban system declined; as Han and Wu report “The rank of Wuhan among Chinese cities, in terms of the number of the work force with middle-level professional titles, industrial output, and cargo transportation, all dropped” (Han and Wu, 2004, 351). In this regard, rather than an actual drop in the economy, Wuhan’s competitors – mainly the coastal cities – all improved in terms of their economic output.

In recent years, commentators have noted the optimistic, opportunistic and competitive attitude of city officials; in 2010, the Wuhan Bureau of Commerce noted that as well promoting the city’s central geographic location, in socio-economic terms, officials were seeking to “create a prosperous society that will help position the city as a modern and international metropolis” (Wuhan Bureau of Commerce, nd). In 2013, the Economic Observer noted that city officials intend to transform the city “of 10 million into a world-class cosmopolitan metropolis comparable to London, New York, Paris and Tokyo by 2049” (Cheng, 2013). Furthermore, the Economic Observer contended that Wuhan’s government sought to make these claims based on the city’s central geographic location, and its longstanding reputation for good quality higher education (Cheng, 2013) (A2). In this regard, whilst Wuhan might not be a world city, government officials and indeed certain businesses seem keen nonetheless to support this urban narrative (A3).

**The Role of Selective Remembering in the Construction of Civic Boosterism: Hankou Merchant Port Nostalgia**

In the writing that follows, we shall argue that a form of selective remembering and urban nostalgia has been critical to the reinforcement of local state attempts to create a global narrative of the city. In an age where globalisation is often associated with ideas of being modern or contemporary, the idea of going back to the past to create new forms of urban branding might appear paradoxical. However, like Shanghai (Pan, 2005) selective remembering and nostalgia have been critical to a local state-led growth coalition that has sought to marketise the history and spaces of the city; indeed, arguably, the local government has drawn upon a range of historic urban branding discourses relating to the three main urban quarters of the city: Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankou (A4). However, amongst the narratives available, the most influential of these discourses is one that relates to the idea of Hankou merchant port nostalgia.

This historic discourse allows the contemporary administration of Wuhan to make connections to the city’s past, its present and its potential future as an expanding economic and cosmopolitan centre within central China. Rather than a discourse of “restorative nostalgia”, that is nostalgia for a
previous economic “golden age”, the discourse of Hankou merchant port nostalgia is future orientated (Boym, 2001). Like Shanghai, state agents have constructed these historic discourses to project a prosperous image of the historic city into the present and the future. Thus, our central argument here is that Hankou merchant port nostalgia allows city officials and developers to brand the city as having deep economic historical roots. To develop this theoretical position, we unpack a series of historical discourses and imaginaries produced by a particular state led growth coalition in Wuhan. For reasons of space, we outline our theoretical position and the concepts we are using, including notions of historical discourse, assemblage, imaginary and growth coalitions, in the appendices below (A5).

METHODOLOGIES: BASIS FOR THE SELECTION OF THE EMPIRICAL DISCOURSES AND THEIR ASSOCIATED SITES

In the following sections, we discuss two empirical discursive sites that we understand to have been central to the production of Hankou merchant port nostalgia. These discursive sites were selected via a ground theory approach that denotes “the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 2). At the beginning of the research process, investigators will “go to the groups which they believe will maximize the possibilities of obtaining data and leads for more data on their question. They will also begin by talking to the most knowledgeable people to get a line on relevancies and leads to track down more data…” (Glaser, 1978, 45). We selected discursive sites for investigation through data snowballing which started with a visit to a planning exhibition at the Wuhan’s citizen’s home (A6). Here at the Wuhan citizen’s home, we informally talked to officials who referred us to other planners, designers and other government representatives. Moreover, at the Wuhan’s citizen home we also took extensive photos and notes of the planning exhibition which conveyed heavy themes of nostalgia through models, display boards, and depictions of future planning displays. Whilst we were not given access to a large sample of city officials and planners, our informal conversations with officials meant we could snowball and gain access to key agents in other quarters of Wuhan. Thus, a very small but important number of formal interviews were conducted, through which we gained a deeper understanding of the urban place-marketing strategies surrounding the city. In the appendix below, a list of our formal interviews with various officials is presented (Table 1) (A7).

On getting a sense of the planning of the city and the historic narratives promoted by the government, we then started a series of key site visits to spaces that featured heavily in the marketing of the city – including sites in the Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankou areas (Figure 1). After we decided to focus on Hankou, we examined several of the main shopping areas, public spaces, and the concession areas; sites in these visits included the Jianghan Road, and its Li-fen neighbours including Shanghai village (which exists alongside the Jianghan Road) (Figure 1). Moreover, we also visited completed developments including the Wuhan Tiandi and sites where new programmes of regeneration and development would take place in the future; these latter sites included the Hanzheng Street area and the markets near these spaces (Figure 1). In some of these areas we tried to compare the existing (undeveloped) site with the suggested proposals (by the officials
we had met) to try and gain a better understanding of local state led urban development plans.

**Visual and Walking Methods**

At the physical sites we examined, we took inspiration from those writers who have explored sensory data in urban landscapes (Pink, 2009); indeed, we took broad walking tours of the urban areas, (particularly in Hankou) to gain an experiential sense of the area and its contents. We often payed close attention to sights, sounds, smells, light, (especially light used to illuminate buildings) and phantasmagoria (Pink, 2009). We took extensive photos of these various case sites (sometimes one visit could produce 100 photos) and took written notes regarding the spaces and the arrangement of urban objects within them. Eventually, the data selected in this project was based around our understanding of where the discourse of merchant port nostalgia was most abundant; as opposed to starting from geographical locations (an idiographic approach), our Foucauldian ontological position meant that we selected spaces, places, people and brochures because they were discursively rich (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011, 66-7). On our return from the fieldtrips, we also collected data from state led tourist and journalistic websites, run by Wuhan’s administration and the provincial administration of Hubei. A rationale for the selection and deselection of different kinds of data is provided in the appendices (A8).

**BACKGROUND TO THE HISTORY OF HANKOU AND/OR HANKOU**

In the history of Wuhan, a third district (which formed after Wuchang and Hanyang) Hankow or Hankou (meaning mouth of the Han River) has been regarded by scholars as having a critical role in the development of the city. As Shu and Qin have claimed the “third part of the city - Hankou was formed... after a diversion of the Han River in 1474” (A9) which led to the area being separating from Hanyang (Shu and Qin, 2014, 1074). As a result of its advantageous location between the “junction of the Yangtze and the Han, port trade in Hankou grew rapidly”, to the extent that it became “the biggest inland port in central China” (Shu and Qin, 2014, 1074). In its earliest years, this new commercial area was overrun with people and
as a result it was “formally designated a *chen* (non-administrative town), with its own governing deputy officials, fiscal obligations, and internal ward structure” (Rowe, 1984, 28). By the early Qing period, (from 1644 onwards) Hankou grew in “national prominence as a centre of trade” (Rowe, 1984, 29). In the mid-seventeenth century, Hankou became the site of “a large regional market specialising in luxury goods” and eventually the “city became a link into an integrated national commercial network” (Mokyr, 2003, 494). During this period, rice from Hunan, Sichuan and Hubei province, passed through Hankou, which in turn enabled the city “to earn huge profits” (Mokyr, 2003, 494). By 1861 Hankou became a colonial “treaty port” and opened to foreign trade; in time new concessions were built in Hankou including the British, French, German, Japanese and Russian concessions (Figure 1) (Mokyr, 2003, 494) (A10). Technically speaking the Hankou Bund (A11) is that line of colonial neo-classical buildings that runs north to south alongside the Yangtze River (Figure 2). As Leffman et al. (2003, 536) have stated, the Bund is “lined with Neo-classical European architecture housing banks, embassies and company...
headquarters” and is characterised by “flood-preventing embankments built by the British in the 1860s” (A12).

With the establishment of the Republic in 1911, Hankou experienced a “golden age of growth and prosperity between 1912 and 1927” (Mackinnon, 2000, 163). Economically in the 1920s Hankou “had become a major financial centre, with its stock market and banking sector important enough... to influence Shanghai and Tianjin” (Mackinnon, 2000, 164). As Mackinnon states:

“[a] string of new buildings went up in the 1920s in the heart of the old commercial district. Streets were redrawn, thoroughfares widened, and plans laid out for a new gridded district west of the railway. The heart of the city became the New Market complex on Jianghan Road (Figure 1) separating the Chinese city from the concession area” (Mackinnon, 2000, 165) (A13).

In the 1930s the economic prosperity of Wuhan stagnated, but ‘foreign trade’ in Hankou might be evidenced by the “foreign freighters of eight to ten thousand tons [that were] berthed at Hankou” (Mackinnon, 2000, 166).

With the ascension to power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, the government built a series of “iron and steel mills” and “nearby iron and coal reserves established Hankou as a metallurgic centre by the late twentieth century” (Moykr, 2003, 494). As commentators have reported, Hankou ‘still contains rice, oil and flour mills and produces cotton and woollen fabrics and other textiles’ and is a major “distribution point” of goods for west and southwest China (Moykr, 2003, 494). Whilst Hankou certainly retains this industrial economic base, in recent years local authorities are considering the economic rejuvenation of the area via the planning and the construction of several financial and commercial zones (A14). Whilst development preparations for some of these zones are still in the planning and design stage, some of these sectors have already witnessed construction. Firstly, there is the Wangjiadun (or CBD) which lies in the centre of downtown Hankou; as sources attest the Wangjiadun is connected to a site called “Construction Avenue” also known as “the wall street of Wuhan” (Wuhan Bureau of Commerce, Nd: 20) (Figure 3). Discussed in the 1996-2020 Wuhan Master Plan, a second financial zone, the Hankou Financial Trade Zone (HFTZ), was ear-marked for construction between the first and the second Yangtze River Bridges (Figure 3). But in the 12th 5 year plan the HFTZ was enlarged and was rebranded as the Hankou Yanjiang CBD; the rebranding extended the original boundary of the site beyond the second Yangtze River Bridge along the Northern riverside (Wuhan Land Resource & Planning Bureau, 2013) (Figure 3). As the Wuhan Bureau of Commerce have reported the Hankou Yanjiang CBD “stands by the Yangtze River and is encircled by Jianghan Road (shopping area), Jinghan Boulevard, Huangpu Road and Yanjiang Avenue’ (Wuhan Bureau of Commerce, nd, 22). Importantly, as the Wuhan Bureau of Commerce nostalgically note “Over a century ago, 20 foreign banks, including Citibank, HSBC, Société Générale and 40 financial services firms were concentrated in the Riverside commercial district of Wuhan, which was recognized as another financial and trading zone in China, next only to Shanghai” (Wuhan Bureau of Commerce, nd, 22).
Together with the area’s internal cultural make-up and economic forces, Hankou has also been the subject of wider city state-led projects. One of the most important of these has been a waterway regeneration project that emerged in the late 1990s when an unprecedented flood hit the Yangtze River area; as a result of this deluge, flood control became a key issue for the local government who then developed a comprehensive response. The waterfront regeneration project in Wuhan (which targeted the riversides of the Yangtze beyond Hankou) was developed in 3 phases (Li, 2011). Phase one (1999-2001) involved the restoration of flood defences and weak spots along the Yangtze River (Figure 4). These projects involved the targeting of danger areas such as Nan An Zui and the Longwang Temple which are located along the junction of the Yangtze and the Han River; this phase of
the regeneration also involved proposals relating to the urban design of the waterfront areas (Li, 2011). Phase two of the regeneration (2002-2006) involved the creation of a series of public amenity resources; in sum, these regeneration processes included a project known as ‘Two Rivers Four Banks’ involved the building of “four banks along the Yangtze River and the Han River… as city open spaces for the public” (Li, 2011, 2) (Figure 4). Within this second phase, as well as the rebuilding of sites in Hanyang and Wuchang, from 2001-2006, a 7-kilometre riverside in Hankou Park was also constructed (Li, 2011, 2) (A15). Phase 3 of the regeneration project (2005 to the present) has involved the reconstruction of the city’s lakes, but this phase has not really involved Hankou and is connected to another state led project described as ‘the city of wetlands’ (Li, 2011, 3) (Figure 4). Whilst this 3-phased regeneration work started in the late 1990s, sources demonstrate that plans for the redevelopment of the Hankou waterfront can be traced to earlier discussions amongst officials in the 1980s: particularly the Water Resources Commission (Liu et al, 2004) (A16).

Language and Landscapes of Merchant Port Nostalgia

Whilst this 3-phased regeneration has certainly improved environmental conditions and public amenities along the banks of the Yangtze, noticeably the reconstruction of some of these spaces have also brought a new discursive language of nostalgia; specifically, as part of the wider riverside regeneration, a visually strikingly nostalgic space along the river front is the Port Culture Square which was opened in September 2003 (Wuhan sub-government for the Jiang tan project, 2011a; 2011b; Wuhan local Chronicles, 2010b) (Figure 1). Indeed, in the nostalgically titled Port Culture Square, the government commissioned the production of 18 statues that were said to be representative of the development of the Hankou port (Yangtze River Daily, 2014); specifically the statues which were constructed at the end of 2002, and which are distributed in a space of 2,500 square metres, depict a series of scenes which show the historic everyday life of the port workers; the scenes portrayed by these statues have been utilised to promote a historical cultural feeling amongst citizens and visitors to the site (Wuhan sub-government for the Jiang tan project, 2011b).

A brief examination of these statues demonstrates that the local state has made a concerted effort to recreate a sense of nostalgia at the Hankou Bund area. Indeed, as these statues suggest several symbolic themes are at play. Firstly, and critically the images of workers carrying cargo boxes convey the idea of generations of Chinese port employees moving goods between shore and the ships which sailed the Yangtze. Moreover, the statue of the colonial official and the affluent couple in republican apparel is symbolic of the many seasons of wealth and prosperity that effected the area. The colonial official also evokes some of the cosmopolitanism which might be associated with the area.

SOUTH WEST HANKOU: HANZHENG STREET 汉正街

The exact historical beginning of Hanzheng Street is difficult to establish. Nevertheless, commentators have pointed to the existence of 4 main “thorough fares” in the nineteenth century which paralleled the riverbank; these included River Street, Main Street, Middle Street and Dike or Back Street (Rowe, 1989, 71). Main Street or Centre Street (A17) is today’s Hanzheng Street which was a site traditionally of ‘shops… big business warehouses and outlets and halls’ (Wang and Liao, 2013: 179) (Figure 13).
Main Street was several miles long and it was in Main Street “alone, that the warehouses of brokers in the city’s great wholesale trades were located” (Rowe, 1989, 76) (A18). By the nineteenth century, Han Zheng Street (or Main Street) was regarded as a wholesale centre (Cheung, 2001, 156); and, as Rowe contends, whilst the ‘long, sinuous main street would not meet the geographer’s strict definition of a “central business district” it was “indisputably central” (Rowe, 1989, 76).

Commentators have confirmed that even in the 1980s, a small commodities market in Hanzheng Street accommodated both “retail and wholesale businesses” (Han and Wu, 2004, 354). With the new state council reforms of the early 1980s, all the markets in Wuhan – including markets such as those in Hanzheng Street were “opened to allow the participation of peasants, traders from other cities in China and from overseas” (Han and Wu, 2004, 354). Cheung (2001) describes Han Zheng Street as a
white centre: a site in which “many wholesalers” re-distribute general merchandise “to retailers in other provinces” (Cheung, 2001, 156). In this regard, it would seem that for many generations, the function of Hanzheng Street appears to have remained relatively unchanged (Figure 15).

However, Hu et al, (2012) have reported that since 1987 the area has been continually refurbished through a series of regenerative projects. The first phase ran approximately between 1987-1991 and involved upgrades to the dilapidated buildings in the area and improvement of the living conditions and commercial environment. Phase 2 which ran through the 1990s (between 1991 and 1999) involved new forms of marketised regeneration that were twinned with real estate and property development. During this period, the ambition of the government was to create a business district in the area. Phase 3, which started from 2003 to the present, is much more ambitious; as Hu et al (2012) have suggested, the aim of the government has been to regenerate the area into an internationally orientated development. Chen notes that since 2003, government led planning strategies also favour the protection of the traditional characteristics of Hanzheng Street (Chen, 2009). Moreover, press reports suggest that the area has seen a series of fires from 2005; notably, after these fires, the government released passionate and determined statements about how it intended to improve the area further (see Qiaokou Government, 2012).
Nostalgic Overtones in the Projected Regeneration of Hanzheng Street

Having met the municipal government and the Wuhan Planning and Design institute (WPDI), we discovered, that the area is ear-marked to become a Cultural Tourism Business District. As we understood this new development is also supported by the Wuhan urban and rural construction group which is a state owned real estate company. A glance over one of their brochures entitled *Hanzheng Street Cultural Tourism Business District* (nd.), demonstrates that whilst the proposed development of Hanzheng Street is relatively modern in form and style, the text itself (and the proposed development) is supported by an implicit language of nostalgia. As well as glossy images of the water front and a series of proposed high rise corporate buildings, the brochure also discusses the history of the street; particularly, the brochure harps back to the deep historical Ming and Qing merchant culture that is said to reside there:

> From [the] Ming dynasty, Hanzheng street led business trade, humanistic fashion; made “Hankou” one of the four most famous towns in Ming, Qing Dynasties and tens of thousands of rich merchants; after the reforming and opening up, it has even become the cradle of China’s private economy, the pioneer leading open and enlivened markets, also has become a gilded signboard in the heart of market practitioners, consumers with the biggest commodity trading volume in our country (SIC) (Wuhan Urban and Rural Construction Group, nd., 24)

Moreover, in other passages of the brochure, the authors directly refer to the street as being the main street of Hankou and a window of Chinese culture.

> For hundreds of years Hanzheng Street, as “the main street of Hankou”, is the logo and window of Chinese culture for its leadership, heavy righteousness and worship to business. The people of Hanzheng Street are the most authentic people of Hankou, and the Hanzheng Street Language is the most authentic Wuhan municipal words. To have a better understanding of Wuhan and Hankou, people must first understand the Hanzheng Street (Wuhan Urban and Rural Construction Group, nd., 23).

In this text, the wholesalers and merchants who currently live on the street are described as being at the heart of a real or authentic Wuhan economic culture that is worthy of deference. Explicitly such texts, create an imaginary of the people of Hankou and Wuhan which might also be attractive to potential investors who are keen to set up businesses in the area. As this writing seems to imply decent, righteous, authentic and honest workers (who worship business) can be found in this space and can – as this text subtly hints – be utilised in terms of labour power for potential investors.

DISCUSSION: HANKOU MERCHANT PORT NOSTALGIA AND URBAN RELOCATION: HAN ZHENG STREET

In the pursuit of selective remembering, arguably more uncomfortable and dissident histories are silenced in the discursive enforcement of a particular historical storyline of Hankou. Of the many uncomfortable histories associated with the area, both the opium trade and the tragic events that took place as a result of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) are possibly the most controversial (Wang, 1995, Baumler, 2007). In relation to the opium trade, Hankou became a major distribution point of Indian opium at the end of the nineteenth century (Baumler, 2007, 157); a historical fact the government plays little if any attention to. Secondly, in relation to the
Cultural Revolution, historians such as Wang have pointed to the role of Hankou in the Million Heroes movement, where the area was called the “guerrilla area” because its two industrial districts, Jiang’an and Qiaokou, were under the Million heroes thumb’ (Wang, 1995, 144) (Figure 3) (A19).

However, in the reconstruction and historic branding of Hankou, these difficult histories remain conspicuously absent. Secondly, issues regarding the knock on effects of much of the historic-led regeneration we have discussed are rarely reflected upon in government development plans for the area. Specifically, the activities that have taken place in the development of the Hanzheng Road street and the spaces surrounding it, are possibly the most dramatic in terms of the consequences that they have had on local communities. Recently the Zall Development (Cayman) Holding Co., Ltd has provided substantial figures regarding the process of community relocation which is slowly changing the culture and economic function of the Hanzheng Street area (A20). In their 2011 annual report, the company reported the construction of the North Hankou Project which refers here to the North Hankou International Trade Centre, the flagship Wuhan-based project of the Zall Development – Cayman – Holding Company. As the Zall Development company, notes the North Hankou Project was “inspired by the traditional wholesale district on Hanzheng Street” and is understood to be the ‘largest wholesale shopping mall in Central China’ (Zall Development - Cayman - Holding Co., Ltd, 2011, 9); as the company notes since 2011, tenants have been relocated from the original Hanzheng Road area, and from the 31st of December 2011, “over 5,000 occupants of the North Hankou Project started their operations, of which approximately 60% had relocated from Hanzheng Street” (Zall Development - Cayman - Holding Co., Ltd, 2011, 10). The effects of these displacements will undoubtedly have consequences for the interesting migrant communities that have created an informal economic culture in the area – including the wholesalers. Thus, Wang has reported on the existence of family workshops and informal self-organising industries that are indicative of a self-sustaining economic community (Wang, 2008). For example, Wang discusses the Baoqing area (one of the areas near Hanzheng Street) and points to a “mix of residence, commerce and production” (Wang, 2008, 177).

CONCLUSION

This paper began with a survey of a series of studies that have sought to examine the role of historical discourse, historical imaginaries, selective remembering and heritage in the marketing and urban branding of Chinese cities. Critically, we suggested that often this research has focused primarily upon the first tier (global) cities of Shanghai and Beijing and as a result second tier cities have rarely featured in contemporary analysis. Acknowledging these gaps, this paper has therefore sought to develop and expand the current field in two ways. Firstly, we have sought to examine the city of Wuhan which has been defined as a second tier or medium sized non-coastal Chinese city. Secondly, we have also sought to investigate and understand the way a discrete growth coalition in Wuhan – which we have called the Historic-Heritage Planning Growth Coalition (HHPCG) – has taken a very active role in the historic marketing of the city; very specifically, we have looked at the role of this growth coalition in the construction of a discourse of Hankou merchant port nostalgia. To develop our inquiry, we looked at 2 data sites. In section 5, we firstly examined a
series of ecological regeneration schemes associated with the Hankou bund and river area. In section 6 we focused on the regeneration and proposed future developments associated with Hanzheng Street and the economic community which surrounds this site.

By exploring these 2 very different regeneration and revitalisation projects, we argued that an implicit and sometimes explicit discourse of Hankou merchant port nostalgia is being reproduced at these sites; specifically, we contended that Hankou merchant port nostalgia is constructed through a variety of discursive (through the media, public texts and expert official texts) and actualised (through statues and street signs) signifiers. Whilst the nostalgia being constructed in Wuhan is very different to the historical discourses constructed in Shanghai, this paper has suggested that the way these historical discourses are processed is very similar; thus, like Shanghai, the discourses that underpin Hankou merchant port nostalgia are also constructed through economic and cosmopolitan histories; as a final note, we would suggest that more research needs to be conducted to understand the way that historical discourses are utilised by other local growth coalitions in China to reinforce new forms of urban branding and inter-city competition. As we have suggested, such forms of urban branding have serious consequences for the way history, identities and even actual material urban landscapes are constructed.

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APPENDICES

A1 The urban tier system has its roots in the party state and sources suggest that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) devised a classification system in the 1950s. However, this urban system was never official established by the government (Qi et al, 2016); in this regard, the current mode of classification has been created in an unofficial way through a series of media forums, businesses, scholars and research institutes; generally speaking, an unofficial or popular understanding of China’s urban system seems to be well-understood across a range of spheres. In 2016, by means of interactive info-graphics the South China Morning post sought to elucidate further on this unofficial system. On their web page which can be accessed here: http://multimedia.scmp.com/2016/cities/. The South China Morning post contends that the system is composed of 4 distinct tiers which have been classified by levels of by GDP, administrative control and population. Tier 1 cities, are those with high levels of GDP, (more
than $300 billion per annum), who are directly controlled by the central government and which have populations of more than 15 million people. Cities, in this tier include Guangzhou, Shanghai, Chongqing, Beijing and Tianjin. Tier 2 cities, are those that have levels of GDP between $68 and 299 dollars per annum, who are provincial or sub-provincial capitals and who have populations of 3-15 million people. Tier 3 cities are those with a GDP of $18-67 billion dollars per annum, who have prefecture capital status and who have populations of 150,000 to 3 million people. Cities in this tier include Wenzhou, Zhangzhou and Dongguan. Finally Tier 4 cities are those with a GDP below $17 billion dollars, who are understood to be county level cities and are populated by less than 150,000 people (Hernandez and Bland, 2016).

A2 The Observer suggested that Wuhan “falls far short of attracting foreign investment” compared to Beijing and Shanghai (Cheng, 2013). Thus, whilst city officials are certainly keen to world Wuhan, reports suggest that locals living within the city are highly critical of these globalising claims and have contended that the administration is fantastical (Cheng, 2013; Florcruz, 2013).

A3 Commercial actors, such as the real estate company Jones Lang LaSalle, share these visions and in a report published in 2015, the company claimed that Wuhan belongs to an elite group of “emerging world cities”; in this report, the company claimed that ‘Wuhan sits among a sub-category of agile higher-quality “Emerging World Cities” such as Bangalore and Dubai that have relatively attractive business environments, extensive development opportunities and comparatively well-educated populations that are allowing them to find niches in global supply chains” (Jones, Lang, LaSalle, 2015).

A4 At the outset of the research we were aware of 4 historical discourses:

The first of these we might loosely describe as ‘political/revolutionary’ nostalgia associated with Wuchang; Wuchang has been often associated with historical political discourses relating to the uprising of 1911, the Republic of China and significant moments in the history of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); writers such as Liu (2012) have discussed a ‘Glorious Revolutionary tradition’ which can be tied up with monumental sites in Wuchang (but sometimes Hankou also) and Wuhan more generally. The second example of contemporary nostalgia in the city relates to the idea of ‘industrial’ nostalgia often associated with Hanyang; Hanyang has been connected with discourses of industry, (particularly the iron works) the Hanyang arsenal (which was originally known as the Hubei arsenal), and the pioneering industrialising efforts of the late Qing dynasty official Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909). Thirdly, another strand of historic discourse relates to Hankou and a form of state led nostalgia that celebrates Ming and Qing dynasty merchant port culture (which includes the colonial era). Finally, and fourthly, we believe that a fourth historic discourse that haunts the city refers to ‘Communist party’ nostalgia associated with monuments and spaces within Wuchang and Hankou.

For reasons of space, in this article we focus primarily on the third of these discourses – the discourse of Hankou merchant port nostalgia – in the marketing of the city. In our study of Wuhan and our survey of the nostalgic branding used within the city, Hankou merchant port nostalgia
is the most conspicuous of these three narratives and is therefore worthy of more analytical consideration.

A5 Historical discourse: When we use the term historical discourse, we are drawing upon the ontological and epistemological ideas of the philosopher and sociologist Michel Foucault (1926-1984). When we are discussing discourses, we are referring to what Foucault describes as a unity, or “regularity”, of statements that come together in a “formation” (Foucault, 1969, 162).

Assemblages: In this article, the idea of assemblages refers to entities that are ‘composed of discursive and non-discursive components: they are both assemblages of bodies and matter and assemblages of enunciation or utterance’ (Patton, 2000, 44). Assemblages are understood as agglomerations of discourse and materiality, which when brought together form sites of heterogeneous unity.

Imaginaries: When we use the concept of imaginaries we are referring to “socially transmitted representational assemblages that interact with people’s personal imaginings and that are used as meaning making and world shaping devices” (Salazar, 2012, 864). As Salazar has pointed out imaginaries can in fact incorporate both the factual and the absolute fantastical as well (Salazar, 2012, 865). In conceptualising ‘Hankou port nostalgia’ as a discursive assemblage we want to contend that this agglomeration can enlist exotic, romantic and fantastical discourses, as a way of reinforcing a narrative of the city.

Growth Coalitions: Traditionally, the idea of a growth coalition refers to ‘coalitions of land based elites, tied to the economic possibilities of places’ (Jonas and Wilson, 1999, 3). Following the writing of Jonas and Wilson (1999) we are also utilising this concept to understand a growth coalition in Wuhan. However, taking inspiration from assemblage theory, we would argue that the idea of a growth coalition is better understood as a heterogeneous assemblage of discourses and non-human elements. Such a heterogeneous assemblage is not necessarily a ‘conscious’ reflexive agent, but is a loosely connected ensemble that works in tandem in the construction of historic discourse.

In conceptualising the idea of a growth coalition, we also acknowledge that there are probably many different kinds of growth coalition in Wuhan. In this respect, and to separate our own unit of analysis from others that might exist within the city, our focus in this paper is concerned with a growth coalition we shall describe as the historic-heritage planning growth coalition (HHPGC); indeed, the focus of the HHPGC rests with the marketing of the city through history, nostalgia and heritage.

Here in this text when we are discussing the Wuhan growth coalition we are referring mainly to the municipal government, (particularly the Hanzheng Jie Business district office), the Wuhan Planning and Design institute (WPDI), the Wuhan urban rural construction group and a whole array of loose commercial and public media outlets that seem to be supporting the narratives and policies of these key agents.

A6 The investigators were aware of certain nostalgic themes running through the marketing and conceptualisation of the city, as a result of living there in two consecutive stays (two months in the periods of March-May 2013 and a second visit of a month between July and August, 2015).
Interviews: Discussions with the respondents often related to issues around conservation and proposed new state sanctioned developments that were being considered – mainly the Hanzheng Road. During the interviews, we were also given access to government documents and brochures, concerning urban regeneration and current development projects. In sum, we met and formally interviewed the following people.

As a result of ethical issues around confidentiality – especially in meeting government officials – interview data has not been made available in this paper. However, the information and statements that were given to us has influenced the nature of our theories, thoughts, findings and interpretations presented in the data sections above.

After analysing lots of data on Hankou and Wuhan more generally, we selected 2 discursive sites for the reproduction of the discourse of 'Hankou port nostalgia'; these were 1) an ecological/environmental regeneration project conducted along the banks of the Yangtze (including the Hankou side); 2) and a growing regeneration project associated with the Qiaokou district of Hankou and the Hanzheng Road area. In the first instance, our choice of these discursive sites, was based on the premise that these spaces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal conversations</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal government officials.</td>
<td>At the Municipal people’s government located in Hankou (at the former German Embassy) off Yanjiang Avenue</td>
<td>Officials from the municipal government – we met a small number of officials from the municipal people’s government and we formally interviewed an official at the Business district office (involved in the planning and development of the Hanzheng Road project).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planners and urban designers</td>
<td>Wuhan Planning and design institute – planning and design office 1</td>
<td>Government Planners and urban designers – we met a small number of officials from the Wuhan Planning and Design Institute (WPDI) and interviewed the Vice General Planner (Senior Planner).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hankou residents</td>
<td>Shanghai village (within the British concession within Hankou; near Jianghang Street)</td>
<td>We met a small number of local residents and specifically we conducted 2 formal interviews with two late middle aged long-term residents of the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hankou residents</td>
<td>Janghan village (within the British concession in Hankou, very close to Jianghang Street).</td>
<td>1 formal interview with a local shop owner.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Table of formal interviews.
were rich in Hankou merchant port nostalgia; but moreover, we selected these discursive sites, because we believe that the discourse of Hankou merchant port nostalgia is part of a broader (implicit) strategy of urban regeneration.

A9 Although, Rowe argues that this diversion took place slightly earlier in 1465 (Rowe, 1984, 28).

A10 Specifically, the treaty of Shimonoseki “granted foreigners the right to open factories in treaty ports” (Mackinnon, 2008, 9).

A11 Photographs and maps extracted from the early twentieth century clearly demonstrate that the Hankou riverfront and its colonial buildings were known as the Hankou Bund (see also Han and Wu, 2004, 350).

A12 The opening of the treaty port also bought steamships to Hankou, and enabled the area to enter “the international tea trade” (Mokyr, 2003, 494). By the late 1890s as a result of the continuing first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), control of trade in Hankou was influenced by western colonists and as a result “foreign trade tripled” (Mokyr, 2003, 494). With the development of the foreign concession areas, local trade was also stimulated and in 1905 ‘China’s first north-south railway, the Beijing-Hankou line’ further secured the ‘strategic importance of Hankou in domestic commodity trade’ (Mackinnon, 2000, 163). Despite the role of the colonists in the development of a new culture of wealth, sources suggest that locals were very unhappy about the exclusive presence of foreigners in Hankou (see Leffman et al 2003, 536). However, and supported by the Qing establishment during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, “Hankou… was a highly policed and administered city – a major entrepôt completely under the official thumb of the government” (Wakeman, 2009, 342).

A13 The traditional centre of Hankou rested in the so called “Chinese section” of the area which resided within the South West of Hankou – including Main Street (or Hanzheng Road). As Mackinnon suggests the new commercial centre slowly came into existence after the colonisation of the North East of Hankou and the formation of the colonial concession areas after the 1860s.

A14 As we have seen in the 1920s, Hankou was a major financial centre before its economic functions seemed to have changed. However, as sources suggest by the late 1990s the financial functions of Hankou seem to have been revived once again. Indeed, in 1998, the Jianghan district ‘attracted, accumulatively, more than 90% of the domestic and foreign commercial banks and financial organisations in Wuhan’ (Han and Wu, 2004, 358). In this respect, the construction of the new financial zones, we are discussing, appears to build upon these historical legacies.

A15 Shu and Qin (2014) have discussed Phase two of the regeneration project in more detail. In 1996 city officials “envisaged the transformation of the waterfront of the Yangtze in Hankou” (Shu and Qin, 2014, 1076). After a national competition (developed by the ministry of construction), Wuhan locals called for the introduction of a ‘public green walkway along the great river’ (Shu and Qin, 2014, 1076) (the park created in Phase 2). The suggested regeneration of the waterfront was also understood to be expedient in terms of the dividends it would yield for flood protection.

A16 Despite the general economic prosperity of Hankou, Hankou waterfront had been “abandoned” as a result of the decline of the “ancient
industrial port” (Shu and Qin, 2014, 1076). Before the riverside of Hankou (nearly 200,000 m2) was cleared in the late 1990s, commentators have suggested that the river was chaotic, and full of temporally-built and simply-structured warehouses, container yards, buildings and nearly 50 different sized old ports (Meng and Liu, 2007).

A17 Wang and Liao, (2013) call this “centre street” in their paper.

A18 As Wang and Liao point out, Main Street and Dike Street, which run parallel to the Han River, are the longest streets in Hankou (Wang and Liao, 2013, 175). A cursory glance at the map above (Figure 15) shows that Hanzheng Street contains many sub-lanes which splinter down in a perpendicular fashion to the Han river, forming what Wang and Liao describe as a “fishbone structure” (Wang and Liao, 2013, 175).

A19 As Walder has said of the Wuhan incident of July 1967, the suppression of the Million hero’s movement led to the killing of 600 people and the permanent injuring of another 66,000 (Walder, 2015, 250).

A20 The Zall Development (Cayman) Holding Co., Ltd is a real estate and enterprise management company that has its headquarters in Hong Kong, and other offices in Wuhan and the Cayman Islands.

A21 Jiang tan (pinyin) meaning river bund.
SEARCHING FOR ECONOMIC AND COSMOPOLITAN ROOTS: THE HISTORICAL DISCOURSE OF “HANKOU MERCHANT PORT NOSTALGIA” IN THE CENTRAL CHINESE CITY OF WUHAN

In the last few years, discussions of historic urban place-marketing and urban place branding have emerged within the field of Chinese urban studies. Specifically, writers have often discussed how coalitions of the state, entrepreneurs and developers within the city of Shanghai have come together to utilise local history for the purposes of place marketing and urban branding. However, broader research into historical place-marketing into other Chinese cities is still under researched; attending to this gap in the literature, this paper seeks to explore the everyday and “second tier” city of Wuhan (located in central China); examining a growth coalition within the city, this paper examines the idea that, like Shanghai, growth coalitions of developers and state led officials have drawn upon a range of powerful and attractive historic discourses to market the city; of the many historic discourses available, we argue that a narrative of “Hankou merchant Port” nostalgia has been the most prominent in the promotion and marketing of a new historic imaginary of the city. We contend that like the 1920-30s Colonial-Republican brand associated with Shanghai, the “Hankou merchant Port” nostalgia brand also enables a marketing of the city as having economic and cosmopolitan roots. Whilst this branding strategy will probably have positive economic benefits for the city, it our contention that the construction of “Hankou merchant Port” has very serious consequences for the politics of local histories, identities, the restructuring of material urban landscapes and the communities that live and/or work within these spaces.

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